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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The technical vision of the emerging net-centric Global 
Information Grid (GIG) encompasses support for high 
assurance authentication and multilevel security (MLS) as 
well as flexible, dynamic security policies.  The GIG is 
intended to address the inefficient exchange of information in 
current military and intelligence operations that utilize a 
variety of specialized (so-called “stove-piped”) systems.  In 
this context, secure information access problems are 
exacerbated by the need to share information from networks 
at different classifications (e.g., Unclassified, Secret, and Top 
Secret) and within multinational coalitions in episodic, ad hoc 
situations.   
These challenges provide the impetus for the creation of the 
Monterey Security Architecture (MYSEA) Testbed.  The 
purpose of this Testbed is to support research in high 
assurance multilevel security (MLS) [1, 2] and dynamic 
security, two areas that are critical to the realization of the 
GIG’s assured information sharing vision.   
The MYSEA Testbed is an evolving environment that 
facilitates experimentation with the following (* denotes a 
future experiment): 
• Assured authentication and trusted path access to MLS 
services 
• Application of high assurance system-security technology 
to the integration of commercial and legacy components 
• Centralized security management 
• Integration of high assurance multilevel security with 
existing sensitive networks 
• High assurance trusted communication channel 
techniques for managing access to classified networks 
• Use of open architectures and standards 
• Use of XML tags as security markings 
• Secure single sign-on across multiple MLS servers 
• High assurance component authentication and 
attestation* 
• Secure collaborative information sharing* 
Our experience to date regarding the construction of a test 
facility for high assurance MLS components and other 
emerging IA technologies associated with the GIG is 
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summarized here.  We have used the GIG as an exemplary 
framework, but any extended, rapidly evolving enterprise  
(e.g., government, or commercial) with information assets 
having a range of value and criticality as well as a range of 
users with different authorizations will have similar 
requirements. 
II. TESTBED DESIGN OVERVIEW 
The Testbed design is shown in Figure 1.  The near-term goal 
is to demonstrate how U.S. participants can use a single 
commercial workstation for access to multilevel enclaves as 
well as to U.S. and coalition networks at different 
classification levels.  Demonstration scenarios on the Testbed 
show that it is feasible to afford unmodified, popular desktop 
applications, e.g. the Microsoft Office suite, to clients in a 
MLS/Multiple Security Level (MSL) environment and to 
provide users within a community of interest network with 
web-based views of multilevel information.  
Using predominantly COTS components, the Testbed 
provides an experimental environment for the following 
functionalities:   
• True multilevel access to data at multiple levels of 
security using a single commercial workstation, 
• Single-level-at-a-time access to sensitive single level 
networks (e.g., Unclassified and Secret enclaves) using a 
single commercial workstation, 
• Use of heterogeneous operating systems, hardware 
components and applications, 
• Use of a high assurance server as the locus of security 
policy enforcement, 
• Use of hand held appliances for trusted path support 
• Controlled interaction of disparate coalitions and 
enclaves, and 
• Controlled Internet access. 
 
Although Figure 1 shows only one MLS server, the MYSEA 
design supports a federation of MLS servers for better 
performance, scalability and reliability.  The MYSEA server 
(hosted on an XTS-400) enforces a unified mandatory access 
control security policy, viz., confidentiality and integrity.  The 
Trusted Path Extension (TPE) device is responsible for 
providing a secure interface for user interaction with selected 
MYSEA server security functions.  After a successful login 
and session level negotiation via the trusted path, an MLS 
LAN user can access any data at the MYSEA server to which 
he is authorized by the security policy.  The current MYSEA 
security policy allows reading information that is at the same 
or lower in sensitivity than the negotiated session level.  All 
 enabling technology is part of the MYSEA’s thin-client 
migration strategy. 
The Command and Control Personal Computer (C2PC) 
system, a battlefield situational awareness tool, is used in the 
Testbed to demonstrate the ability to support existing mission-
critical applications.  The C2PC REPEAT track simulator 
feeds simulated tactical information to the C2PC Gateway and 
C2PC Clients.  The C2PC Gateway provides tactical track 
data received from the REPEAT server to the C2PC Clients 
and forwards track updates from the C2PC Clients back to the 
REPEAT server.   
Both military-grade Type 1 encryption devices (TACLANE 
encryptors) and commercial VPN appliances are used in the 
Testbed to simulate the protected end-to-end communication 
between the MLS controlled environment and remote single 
level networks. Two pairs of TACLANE encryptors with 
dummy test keys are used to simulate the encrypted channels 
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Figure 1.  Testbed Topology information written will be labeled at the negotiated session 
level. 
 
Similarly, the Trusted Channel Module (TCM) device is a 
trusted component responsible for providing secure 
identification of single level networks connected to the 
MYSEA server.   When one or more networks are connected 
to the MYSEA server via a given TCM, the network users can 
only access data on the MYSEA server at the classification 
level assigned to that TCM.   
The Testbed is isolated from our campus intranet as well as 
the Internet, except for selected test scenarios that 
demonstrate access to the Internet. 
III. ACCOMPLISHMENTS 
Under development since 2004, the MYSEA Testbed is being 
constructed in phases.  This section summarizes our 
accomplishments in the initial phase. 
The MYSEA server in the Testbed is currently configured to 
run an Apache-like web server, and modified sendmail and 
imapd mail servers.  After a successful login to the MYSEA 
server at an authorized session level via the TPE, a user on the 
MLS LAN can view web pages at the same or lower 
sensitivity level.  The user can also exchange email with other 
users who are logged in at the same session level, and can 
read email at lower sensitivity levels that has been previously 
downloaded into the user’s local mail storage.  Furthermore, 
the user can run the following COTS applications via an 
integrated web portal interface: MS Office suite, MS Project, 
MS Outlook Express, C2P2 Client (running as a remote 
application on a remote application server). 
The web portal server (currently Tarantella) provides to MLS 
LAN clients, via an integrated portal view, web-based 
applications that run on different server platforms (Windows, 
Unix, Linux).  This permits the use of standard web browsers 
to access proprietary applications on the simulated legacy 
networks, e.g., Project or PowerPoint.   The inclusion of web-
are geographically separated.  For day-to-day testing, two 
pairs of Cisco IPsec VPN devices are used in place of the 
TACLANE devices, which require special handling.   
A strict life cycle process has been put in place to provide 
stability and repeatability for tests and experiments.  Only 
authorized personnel are granted access to the Testbed, and 
only stable hardware components and software releases may 
be installed on the Testbed.  Changes to the Testbed undergo 
an extensive series of regression tests. 
IV. FUTURE PLANS 
In addition to conducting performance measurement and 
analysis to assess the overhead costs of the custom software, 
we also expect to incorporate into the Testbed the following 
functionalities that are currently under development: 
• MLS services:  NFS and SAMBA support 
• “Stateless” MLS LAN clients with persistent user data 
and metadata stored on the MYSEA server  
• Support for running remote client applications on the 
MYSEA server 
• Provision of secure remote shell capability to both local 
and remote clients 
• A proof-of-concept TCM prototype 
• IPsec-based dynamic security services 
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